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In Brown v. Board of Education, the United States Supreme Court invalidated
state and local school segregation laws as a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Equal Protection Clause. That same day, in Bolling v. Sharpe, the Court
held unconstitutional de jure segregation in Washington, D.C.’s public schools un-
der the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Fifty years after it was decided,
Bolling remains one of the Warren Court’s most controversial decisions.
The controversy reflects the widespread belief that the outcome in Bolling re-
flected the Justices’ political preferences and was not a sound interpretation of the
Due Process Clause. The Bolling Court stands accused of “inventing” the idea
that due process includes a guarantee of equal protection equivalent to that of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
A careful analysis of Bolling v. Sharpe, however, reveals some surprises. First,
the almost universal portrayal of Bolling as an opinion relying on an ”equal pro-
tection component” of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is incorrect.
In fact, Bolling was a substantive due process opinion with roots in Lochner era
cases such as Buchanan v. Warley, Meyer v. Nebraska, and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters. The Court, however, chose to rely explicitly only on Buchanan because
the other cases were too closely associated with Lochner.
Another surprise is that the proposition that Bolling has come to stand for, that
the Fifth Amendment prohibits discrimination by the Federal Government, was
not simply ”made up” by the Supreme Court, but has a basis in longstanding
precedent.
Finally, Bolling is an important example of the distorting effect of Lochnerphobia
on Supreme Court jurisprudence. Bolling would have been a much stronger opin-
ion had it been willing to explicitly rely on Lochner era precedents such as Meyer,
and to employ a more explicitly Lochnerian view of the Due Process Clause.
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 In Brown v. Board of Education, the United States Supreme Court invalidated state and local 
school segregation laws as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.2  
That same day, in Bolling v. Sharpe, the Court held unconstitutional de jure segregation in 
Washington, D.C.’s public schools under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.3  Fifty 
years after it was decided, Bolling remains one of the Warren Court’s most controversial 
decisions.   
The controversy reflects the widespread belief that the outcome in Bolling reflected the 
Justices’ political preferences and was not a sound interpretation of the Due Process Clause.  The 
Bolling Court stands accused of “inventing” the idea that due process includes a guarantee of 
equal protection equivalent to that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.4  
Bolling is especially infamous for the following dictum:  “In view of our decision in Brown that 
the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools,” Chief 
Justice Earl Warren wrote, “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a 
lesser duty on the Federal Government.”5  This dictum, considered alone, sounds very much like 
a concession that the Court could find no proper legal basis for its decision in Bolling, beyond 
the “unthinkability” of a contrary decision.6
Yet the prominence given to the “unthinkable” dictum has obscured the fact that in the 
preceding three paragraphs of the Bolling opinion, Warren provided a more traditional “legal” 
rationale for the Court’s ruling: 
 
                                                          
1 Professor, George Mason University School of Law.  An earlier version of this Essay was presented at the 
Georgetown University Law Center conference Bolling v. Sharpe at 50: Desegregation in the District of Columbia: 
Past, Present and Future in April 2004.  The author thanks George Mason’s Law and Economics Center for 
providing financial support for this Essay.  Jack Balkin and Mike Seidman have provided helpful comments. 
2 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).  
4 See infra notes 23–34 and accompanying text. 
5 Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500. 
6 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment’s Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541, 546 
(1977) (noting that the Bolling opinion “lay the Court open to the charge that what it found ‘unthinkable’ was the 
political implication of a contrary decision, rather than an anomaly of constitutional principle”). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Bernstein (93.4)  2 
We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining 
racially segregated public schools. The legal problem in the 
District of Columbia is somewhat different, however. The Fifth 
Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does 
not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth 
Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of 
equal protection and due process, both stemming from our 
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The “equal 
protection of the laws” is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited 
unfairness than “due process of law,” and, therefore, we do not 
imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this 
Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to 
be violative of due process. 
Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with 
particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence 
constitutionally suspect. As long ago as 1896, this Court declared 
the principle “that the Constitution of the United States, in its 
present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are 
concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or by the 
States, against any citizen because of his race.” And in Buchanan 
v. Warley, the Court held that a statute which limited the right of a 
property owner to convey his property to a person of another race 
was, as an unreasonable discrimination, a denial of due process of 
law.  
Although the Court has not assumed to define “liberty” with 
any great precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from 
bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of 
conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be 
restricted except for a proper governmental objective. Segregation 
in public education is not reasonably related to any proper 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art30
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governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of 
the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary 
deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.7  
 
Thus, the opinion made the following points: first, that although the Fifth Amendment, 
which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause, the 
concepts of equal protection and due process both arise from the American ideal of fairness.8  
While not interchangeable, the phrases are not mutually exclusive, and the Court has previously 
recognized that unjustified discrimination may violate due process.9  Second, classifications 
based on race “must be scrutinized with particular care” because they run contrary to American 
tradition.10  And, third, forcing Blacks to attend segregated schools arbitrarily deprives them of 
their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.11
In subsequent opinions, the Supreme Court interpreted Bolling as an equal protection case,12 
and it eventually held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains an equal 
protection guarantee precisely equivalent to that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.13  However, as Larry Lessig has noted, a close reading of Bolling reveals that 
“[w]hat is significant about the actual opinion . . . is not that the Court found an ‘equal protection 
component’ to the Due Process Clause.  No such ‘component’ was ever ‘found.’”14
While dicta in Bolling state that the concept of due process overlaps to some extent with the 
concept of equal protection, the ultimate holding of the Court is based on the traditional due 
process concern that the government not engage in arbitrary deprivations of liberty.15  As Justice 
David Souter has explained, Bolling concluded that the federal government had no legitimate 
                                                          
7 Bolling, 347 U.S. at 498–500 (citations omitted). 
8 See id. at 499. 
9 See id. at 499 n.2. 
10 See id. at 499. 
11 See id. at 500. 
12 See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1964) (citing Bolling for the proposition that “while the Fifth 
Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be 
violative of due process.”). 
13 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (“This Court’s approach to Fifth Amendment equal 
protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”).  As we shall see, the statement in this parenthetical is incorrect, but it does reflect the state of the 
law from 1975 until today. 
14 Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 409 (1995). 
15 See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500. 
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government interest in requiring segregated schools that could overcome Blacks’ contrary liberty 
interest not to be relegated to Jim Crow schools.16
 The only novelty in Bolling is the idea that forcing Blacks to attend segregated schools 
infringed on a liberty right protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Once the 
Court identified this liberty right, the only remaining question was whether the federal 
government could justify school segregation as a valid exercise of the federal government’s 
exercise of sovereign authority in the District of Columbia.  Given that Brown failed to accord 
any weight to (or even mention) the defendants’ state police power arguments in favor of 
segregation,17 the answer was obviously “no.” 
Part I of this Essay reviews scholarly criticism of Bolling.  With the exception of Lessig,18 
legal scholars have not seriously addressed Bolling’s stated “substantive due process”19 
rationale.  Rather, scholars criticize Bolling for purportedly holding that the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause provides an equal protection guarantee equivalent to that of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  To critics of the Warren Court, Bolling is an example of judicial activism run 
amok, with the Warren Court using the Due Process Clause to avoid reaching a constitutionally 
mandated result that considered “unthinkable” for extra-legal reasons.  By contrast, scholars 
more sympathetic to Warren Court jurisprudence embrace the result in Bolling, but reject, or at 
least refuse to endorse, its reliance on the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
As we shall see in Part II, there was in fact precedent far stronger than the rather lame 
precedents cited by the Court20 supporting Bolling’s dicta that due process and equal protection 
                                                          
16 See Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings 
before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 305 (1990) (statement of Judge Souter). 
17 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
18 See Lessig, supra note 14. 
19 I dislike the term “substantive due process,” but will use it in this Article because of its widespread use to describe 
jurisprudence protecting liberty rights via the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  As 
applied to Lochner-era jurisprudence, and perhaps even to Bolling, the phrase “substantive due process” is 
anachronistic. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 245 (2000) (explaining that it was 
not until the 1950s that jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause was firmly separated by courts and legal 
scholars into “substantive” and “procedural” categories).  
20 The Court cited three Fifth Amendment cases in support of its statement that “as this Court has recognized, 
discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process”: Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 
329 (1943); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1939); and Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 
(1937).  Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499. 
Currin is of no help to the Court, as it simply states that although the exercise of the commerce power is 
subject to the Fifth Amendment, “that Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, has no equal protection clause.” 306 U.S. 
at 14.  Davis repeats the same point, though it adds that the Court assumes that discrimination in taxation, “if gross 
enough, is equivalent to confiscation and subject under the Fifth Amendment to challenge and annulment.” 301 U.S. 
at 585.  Detroit Bank, meanwhile, states on the one hand that the Fifth Amendment “contains no equal protection 
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limits on government’s power to discriminate overlap to some extent.  The historical relationship 
between due process and equal protection is discussed in Part II. 
More important, critics fail to grapple with Bolling’s holding that public school segregation 
was an arbitrary violation of Black students’ due process liberty interest in pursuing their 
education.  Strong precedents from the 1910s and 1920s supported Bolling’s conclusion that due 
process of law prohibited the government from classifying based on race or sex when doing so 
resulted in a violation of liberty or property rights, and the classification in question was not 
based on any inherent differences between the groups classified.  
Bolling, in fact, referenced a 1917 precedent directly on point—Buchanan v. Warley.21  
Buchanan invalidated a residential segregation ordinance under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause as a  deprivation of liberty and property not justified by the state’s claimed 
police power interests in keeping the races separate.22  Lochner era precedent also supported 
Bolling’s implicit conclusion that violation of liberty rights protected by the Due Process Clause 
could not be justified by appeals to prejudice against, or fear of, minority groups.23  Once the 
Court identified a property or liberty interest protected by the Constitution’s guarantee of due 
process of law, a deprivation of this liberty could not be justified by mere racism, sexism, or 
hostility toward minorities.24  However, as I will show in Part III, the Court failed to cite these 
precedents because of Lochnerphobia—the Court, responding in particular to objections from 
Justice Black, did not want to seen as endorsing or reviving the substantive due process 
jurisprudence of the Lochner era. 
 I. SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF BOLLING 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
clause and it provides no guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress.”  317 U.S. at 337.  On the other 
hand, the Court acknowledges that discriminatory legislation “may be so arbitrary and injurious in character as to 
violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.”  Id. at 338.  Each of the latter two cases could be interpreted 
not as stating that the Due Process Clause contains an equal protection component, but as stating that taxation is 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause when it amounts to arbitrary confiscation.  Concern with arbitrary 
confiscation is not quite the same as the traditional equal protection concern with arbitrary classification.  Moreover, 
in each of these cases the Court ruled against the plaintiff, leaving any Fifth Amendment basis for invalidating 
discriminatory legislation vague and unclear, at least based on these precedents. 
21 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
22 Id. at 82. 
23 See infra notes 143–153 and accompanying text. 
24 See, e.g., Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Buchanan,  245 U.S. at 
60. Lessig asserts that Bolling recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment inaugurated a “middle republic” granting 
full citizenship rights to African Americans, after which “[f]ederal powers can no longer be used to advance 
interests of racial inequality.”  Lessig, supra note 14, at 410. 
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 As noted previously, scholarly criticism of Bolling typically finds fault in the opinion’s 
purported discovery of an “equal protection component” to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, or criticizes the Court for its “unthinkable” dictum.  But scholars have not seriously 
addressed the Court’s underlying rationale for its decision—that Black children forced to attend 
segregated schools were being deprived of liberty without due process, a deprivation not justified 
by any valid police power rationale. 
 Critics of the Warren Court’s alleged judicial activism have been especially scathing in their 
criticism of Bolling.25  Raoul Berger states that the so-called “equal protection tradition” of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was “born” in Bolling.26  But he regards the idea that the 
Due Process Clause contains an equal protection guarantee as “quite untenable.”27  First, he 
argues that “the conception of due process constitutionalized in 1789 could not contain an as yet 
unknown component.”28 Second, he observes that “the framers of the fourteenth amendment 
added to due process an equal protection clause, a considered judgment that the due process 
clause had no element of equal protection.”29
Similarly, Robert Bork sharply criticizes Bolling, calling it “social engineering from the 
bench,” a mistaken interpretation of due process on par with Dred Scott and Lochner.30  He 
(incorrectly) states that the Bolling Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause “included the same equal protection . . . concept” as the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause31 and that this conclusion “rested on no precedent or history.”32  Bork also 
addresses the Court’s reliance on due process more generally.  He asserts that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment understood due process to refer to procedures only, which is why they 
also included a “requirement of equal protection in the substance of state laws.”33  Bork’s view, 
                                                          
25 Thus, one can describe Bolling as “universally accepted” only if one limits the universe to supporters of Warren 
Court jurisprudence.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2365 (2002) (describing Bolling as 
“universally accepted” but noting the difficulty of justifying it using originalist methods of constitutional 
interpretation). 
26 Raoul Berger, Insulation Of Judicial Usurpation: A Comment On Lawrence Sager’s “Court-Stripping” Polemic, 
44 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 629 n.173 (1983). 
27 Raoul Berger, Activist Censures of Robert Bork, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 993, 1015 (1991). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 83-84 (1990). 
31 As noted previously, the Bolling Court did not state this, though later Supreme Court opinions did.  See 
Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). 
32 BORK, supra note 30, at 83. 
33 Id. 
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of course, would lead to the abolition of substantive due process opinions, so his critique goes 
well beyond the Bolling opinion. 
Michael McConnell, meanwhile, concludes that “[t]he suggestion that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits segregation of public facilities is without 
foundation.”34 McConnell finds it not just “thinkable” but highly plausible that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment sought to put equal protection restrictions on the states that they did not 
seek to put on the federal government, given the Republicans’ firm control of Congress, and their 
strong distrust of the recently-rebellious southern states. 
Professor Lino Graglia is perhaps the most scathing critic of the Court’s decision in 
Bolling.35  In Graglia’s view, Bolling shows that activist Justices ignore the text of the 
Constitution to achieve desired political results.36  Graglia writes that “everyone knows, or thinks 
he knows, that school racial segregation was held unconstitutional in Brown because the Court 
found it prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”37  He argues, 
however, that “the Equal Protection Clause was not necessary to the decision; that is, the same 
result could and would have been reached in its absence.”38
To prove his thesis, Graglia points to Bolling: 
On the same day the Court decided Brown, it also decided Bolling v. 
Sharpe, a challenge to school racial segregation by federal law in the 
District of Columbia. Because the Equal Protection Clause occurs only in 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which does not apply to the federal 
government, it was not available for the case. What difference did its 
absence make in the result reached? None at all; school segregation was 
found no less constitutionally prohibited in the District of Columbia. . . . 
This time, however, segregation was found to violate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which does apply to the federal 
government. In other words, we are asked to believe that a constitutional 
provision adopted in 1791 as part of a Constitution that explicitly 
                                                          
34 Michael W. McConnell, Michael W. McConnell (concurring in the judgment), in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 158, 166 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).  
35Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Law: A Ruse for Government by an Intellectual Elite, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 767, 
774 (1998). 
36 See id.  
37 Id.  
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recognized and protected slavery was meant to prohibit school racial 
segregation.  If the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not 
exist, the Court would simply have had to rely, with equal validity, on 
some other constitutional provision, perhaps the provision prohibiting 
discrimination among seaports.39
 
 Lucas Powe, though not a consistent critic of the Warren Court, finds the Court’s reliance on 
the Due Process Clause in Bolling “stunning.”40  Powe states that Warren could have shown that 
the due process had a strong equal protection component prior to the Civil War “but this had 
been lost in history, and Warren did not rediscover it.  He just asserted the point.”41  According 
to Powe, the Supreme Court had never before found that the due process and equal protection 
clauses banned similar actions.42
 Other legal scholars, generally those more sympathetic to the Warren Court and its 
egalitarian jurisprudence, support the result in Bolling, but none seem to have endorsed the 
Court’s due process reasoning.  Indeed, several prominent scholars have harshly criticized 
Bolling, often misinterpreting Bolling as an equal protection case.  Sandy Levinson writes that 
“[t]here is no satisfactory theory . . . that explains the imposition on the federal government . . . 
of the equal protection norms.”43  John Hart Ely calls the Bolling decision “gibberish both 
syntactically and historically.”44  Thomas Grey cites Bolling an example of “when the Court 
treats the words of the Constitution as essentially irrelevant to its decision.”45  
Frank Michelman adds that “[i]t may well be true that the original American constitutional 
conception of due process of law reflected a natural right tradition—‘a higher law background,’ 
as it has been called—containing a requirement of formal generality in law and formal equality 
before the law.”46  However, Michelman adds that the antebellum constitutional understanding 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 32 (2000). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 147(1988). 
44 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 32 (1980). 
45 Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211, 230 (1988). 
46 Frank I. Michelman, Frank I. Michelman (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), in WHAT BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 34, at 124, 128. 
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cut from this tradition would not have precluded de jure segregation.47  Lawrence Sager, 
meanwhile, is greatly troubled by the “baldly prochronistic doctrine that the due process clause 
of the fifth amendment incorporates the principles which underlie the equal protection clause 
(ratified roughly 100 years later).”48  Akhil Amar argues that the words “due process” in the 
Fifth Amendment mean the same thing as the words “due process” in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which in turn must mean something different than the words “equal protection” in 
the Fourteenth Amendment.49
Scholars seeking to justify the result in Bolling instead rely on their own creative 
constitutional reasoning.  Drew Days, for example, asserts that the Citizenship Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment supports the result in Bolling.50  Michelman rests his defense of the 
result in Bolling on unwritten constitutional principle found in neither the history nor the text of 
the Constitution.51  Amar relies on the Citizenship Clause, the Bill of Attainder Clause, and the 
Titles of Nobility Clause to support the result in Bolling.52  Jack Balkin argues that a complex 
combination of structural, textual, and historical arguments justifies the result in Bolling.53  Like 
Balkin, Bruce Ackerman argues that integrated public school education in the District of 
Columbia was a privilege or immunity of national citizenship, and, like Days, justifies Bolling on 
the basis of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.54
John Hart Ely, writing twenty or so years after his initial condemnation of Bolling, argues 
that “it was the office of the Equal Protection Clause unequivocally to apply to the states a 
command of equality of the sort that the original framers, and this Court among others, had 
already acknowledged in various contexts to be constitutionally aplicable to the federal 
government.”55  Even Ely, however, is unwilling to endorse the Bolling Court’s Due Process 
Clause argument.  He neglects the view that Bolling was an “arbitrary deprivation of liberty” 
                                                          
47 Id. at 129. 
48 Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. But What On Earth 
Can You Do With the Ninth Amendment?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239, 262 (1988). 
49 Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 767 (1999). 
50 Drew S. Days, III, Drew S. Days, III (concurring), in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, 
supra note 34, at 92, 97–98. 
51 Michelman, supra note 46, at 131–32. 
52 Amar, supra note 49, at 768–72. 
53 Jack Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education—A Critical Introduction, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 34, at 3, 63–64. 
54 Bruce Ackerman, Bruce Ackerman (concurring), in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, 
supra note 34, at 100, 114–16. 
55 John Hart Ely, John Hart Ely (concurring in the judgment except as to the remedy), WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF 
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case rather than an equal protection case, and expressly passes on the question of “whether the 
term ‘due process’ can responsibly [be interpreted] to contain” a “command of equality” similar 
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.56  Instead, to support Bolling’s 
outcome, Ely relies on the Declaration of Independence, various early nineteenth-century cases, 
and especially the Ninth Amendment. 57
Thus, legal scholars almost completely ignore Bolling’s holding that substantive due process 
prohibits the Federal Government from arbitrarily restricting Blacks to segregated public 
schools.  And to the extent that they see Bolling as an equal protection case, they fail to consider 
whether there was a basis in precedent for the notion that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause creates limits on discriminatory legislation.  The historical relationship between due 
process and antidiscrimination concerns is discussed in the next Part of this Essay. 
 
II. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
The idea that due process considerations limited government’s power to discriminate 
stretches back to the early years of the American republic.58  The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, to the extent it was thought to have “substance” at all, was initially 
thought to include—and perhaps even be limited to—a prohibition on discriminatory “class” 
legislation.59  In the early twentieth century, several state courts explicitly invalidated 
discriminatory legislation based solely on due process considerations.60
During the Lochner era, Supreme Court litigants frequently asserted that the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause included an equal protection component.  The Court initially 
remained agnostic on the matter.  However, by 1921, the Court acknowledged in dicta that the 
concept of due process contained in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments included an equal 
protection component, albeit a weaker one than that contained in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause.  And in 1923, in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, the Court invalidated a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 34, at 135, 139. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See Vanzant v. Waddell, 10 Tenn. 260, 269–70 (1829).  See generally RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
(1926). 
59 See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
60 See infra note 80. 
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District of Columbia law that mandated minimum wages for women in part because of equality 
concerns raised under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.61  
Meanwhile, Buchanan v. Warley suggested that once a court identified a recognized due 
process liberty or property interest invaded by a statute or government policy, that law or policy 
could not be defended under the police power based on a discriminatory rationale.62   This 
understanding of the egalitarian limits on the assertion of the police power to justify 
infringements on rights protected by due process was reiterated in Adkins, where the Court held 
that outdated notions of women’s capabilities could not justify a sex-based minimum wage 
law.63
A. THE PRE-LOCHNER UNDERSTANDING OF DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON DISCRIMINATION 
 Let us recall what legal scholars have written about the Court’s proclamation in Bolling that 
“discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be a violation of due process,” and its further 
dictum that it’s “unthinkable” that the Federal Government may segregate public schools when 
states may not.64  Raoul Berger claims that the idea that the due process includes an equal 
protection component was “born” in Bolling.65  Robert Bork argues that the Court’s assertions 
“rested on no precedent or history.”66  Lucas Powe asserts that the Supreme Court had never 
before found that the due process and equal protection clauses banned similar actions.67  
Lawrence Sager finds Bolling’s antidiscrimination doctrine “baldly prochronistic.”68  Akhil 
Amar insists that the meanings of due process and equal protection do not overlap.69
In fact, however, a long tradition in American thought held that for legislation to be 
considered “the law of the land,” and thus consistent with due process, it must be a “general and 
public law, equally binding upon every member of the community.”70  Meanwhile, “every partial 
or private law . . . is unconstitutional and void.”71  By the postbellum period, “partial” or 
“unequal” legislation was usually referred to as “class legislation.”72  While some authors have 
                                                          
61 See Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
62 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
63 See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 561. 
64 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954). 
65 See Berger, supra note 27, at 629 n.173. 
66 See BORK, supra note 30, at 83. 
67 POWE, supra note 40, at 32. 
68 See Sager, supra note 48, at 262. 
69 See Amar, supra note 49, at 767. 
70 Vanzant v. Waddell, 10 Tenn. 260, 270 (1829). 
71 Id. 
72 See David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. &  MARY L. REV. 211 (1999). 
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closely associated the concept of class legislation with the modern concept of special interest 
legislation,73 in practice, by the late nineteenth century, class legislation was primarily legislation 
that contained arbitrary classifications.74  
In the period just before the Court adopted the liberty of contract doctrine, Supreme Court 
precedent suggested that when states asserted they were acting within their police power, due 
process protection included, or perhaps was even limited to, a ban on class legislation.  The 
Equal Protection Clause, of course, also prohibited unequal legislation, and did so more 
specifically.75  Thus, while the Due Process Clause protected procedural rights from state 
interference, its substantive component overlapped with the Equal Protection Clause. 
Indeed, in Dent v. West Virginia,76 the Supreme Court even declared that an absence of 
arbitrary classification bars both equal protection and due process claims against regulatory 
legislation.  The Court stated, “legislation is not open to the charge of depriving one of his rights 
without due process of law, if it be general in its operation upon the subjects to which it 
relates.”77  More often cited was dictum from Leeper v. Texas,78 stating that “due process is . . . 
secured by laws operating on all alike, and not subjecting the individual to the arbitrary exercise 
of the powers of government unrestrained by the established principles of private right and 
distributive justice.”79  However, unlike some state courts,80 the  Supreme Court did not actually 
                                                          
73 See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED (1993). 
74See Richard S. Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court: 1873-1903, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 667, 688–
89 (1980). 
75See, e.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 33 (1884).  See generally Kay, supra note 74. 
76129 U.S. 114 (1889); cf. State v. Hogan, 58 N.E. 572, 573 (Ohio 1900) (“The test of uniform operation, and with 
respect to the required conformity to the ‘law of the land’ and to the requirement of ‘due process of law,’ seems to 
be that if the law under consideration operates equally upon all who come within the class to be affected, embracing 
all persons who are or may be in like situation and circumstances, and the designation of the class is reasonable, not 
unjust nor capricious or arbitrary, but based upon a real distinction, the law does operate uniformly, and if, added to 
this, the law is enforced by usual and appropriate methods, the requirement as to ‘due process of law’ is satisfied.”) 
77 Dent, 129 U.S. at 124 
78139 U.S. 462, 468 (1891). 
79 Id. This dictum was cited in Florida Cent. & Peninsular R.R. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U.S. 471, 478 (1902), and 
Giozza v. Teirnan, 148 U.S. 657, 662 (1893).  See also Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692, 697 (1891) (quoting but not 
explicitly citing Leeper).  This language was quoted as late as 1921 by the Alabama Supreme Court in Barrington v. 
Barrington, 89 So. 512, 513 (Ala. 1921). 
80 In Hyland v. Sharp, 41 So. 264 (Miss. 1906), the Mississippi Supreme Court invalidated a law taxing the lending 
of money when the collateral for the loan was domestic securities.  The court found that the law involved an 
arbitrary classification. “Can it be possible,” the court asked rhetorically, “that argument should be needed to show 
that the Legislature could not vary the occupation tax by the single consideration as to the kind of security taken for 
a loan?”  Id. at 264.  The court acknowledged that the purpose of the law was to reach those who lend at exorbitant 
interest to necessitous persons, with the penalty being the loss of essential household goods.  Id. at 265.  But by 
banning the use of household items as collateral, without regard to the interest rate of the loan or the actual use of 
the item in question, there was an arbitrary deprivation of property rights without due process of law.  Id.; see also 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art30
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hold any class legislation to be unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause, relying instead on 
the Equal Protection Clause.81  
B. THE UNSETTLED STATE OF DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON DISCRIMINATION DURING THE LOCHNER 
ERA 
By the time Lochner v. New York was decided in 1905,82 the U.S. Supreme Court had 
retreated from its statement in Dent v. West Virginia that a law that was not class legislation 
could not violate the Due Process Clause.  In a series of opinions in the 1890s, the Court, usually 
speaking through Justice Brewer, Harlan, or Peckham, declared that “liberty of contract,” along 
with other vaguely defined fundamental liberties,83 were protected against arbitrary legislation 
by the Due Process Clause.84  In Lochner itself, the Court declined the opportunity to rely on a 
class legislation argument, instead relying on a liberty of contract argument to invalidate a 
maximum hours law for bakers.85  It was Lochner’s substitution of fundamental rights analysis 
for class legislation analysis that allowed the 1920s Supreme Court to broaden due process 
protection of liberty interests to noneconomic matters in cases such as Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters86 and Gitlow v. New York.87
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Rodge v. Kelly, 40 So. 552, 554 (Miss. 1906) (“As written, the statute is unfortunately class legislation, falling 
within the inhibition of the constitutional provisions named [due process and equal protection].”).  In State ex rel. 
Wyatt v. Ashbrook, 55 S.W. 627, 632 (Mo. 1900), the Missouri Supreme Court invalidated a law that prohibited 
employers with more than fifteen employees from selling certain items in large cities without a license.  Due process 
of law, “when having reference to legislative enactments, must mean a requirement of action or abstinence, binding 
upon and affecting alike each and every member of the community of the same class, or of similar circumstances, 
enacted for the general public good or welfare.”  Id.  The law in question, by contrast, involved classification that 
was “was wholly without reason or necessity.  It is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to defy suggestion to the 
contrary.  The simple statement of its creation is a most fatal blow to its continued existence.  It is truly 
‘classification run wild.’  It is special legislation unrestrained.”  Id. 
81 See, e.g., Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 570 (1902) (invalidating an antitrust law that 
exempted only farmers and ranchers); Cotting v. Goddard, 183 U. S. 79, 114-15 (1901) (Harlan, J., concurring for 
six Justices) (invalidating a mine inspection law because it applied only to one of the many mining companies in the 
state); Gulf, Colo., & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 166 (1897) (invalidating a law that allowed plaintiffs 
with small claims against railroads to recover fees and costs if the railroad initially refused to pay the claim and then 
lost at trial, with three Justices dissenting); Kay, supra note 74.  
Note that my interpretation differs from Gillman’s, who sees the Lochner line of cases as reflecting opposition 
to class legislation. My differences with Gillman are explored in David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, 
Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter 
Bernstein, Revisionism].  Similarly, I reject Cass Sunstein’s view that the Lochner line of cases primarily reflected a 
desire to uphold common law norms against legislative redistribution.  See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s 
Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
82 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
83 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
84 See, e.g., id. at 589 (1897) (Peckham, J.); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 165–66 (1895) (Brewer, J.); 
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 661–663 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
85 See Bernstein, Revisionism, supra note 81. 
86 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a law banning private schools). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Bernstein (93.4)  14 
Once due process became the basis for protection of fundamental rights in the late 1890s, 
the Court—which had previously stated that the Due Process Clause’s only substantive 
protection was equality—suggested that the equality component of due process was minimal, if it 
existed at all.  In District of Columbia v. Brooke,88 for example, the plaintiff challenged a 
District of Columbia law that required resident owners of property to connect their property to a 
drainage system on penalty of criminal punishment, while merely assessing nonresident owners 
the cost of having the city do the work for them.  The Court stated, “The defendant in error 
asserts this discrimination and argues its consequences at some length, but does not refer to any 
provision of the Constitution of the United States which prohibits Congress from enacting laws 
which discriminate in their operation between persons or things.”89  A commentator wrote that 
this language “intimates” that “Congress may enact class legislation” and asserting that “[t]his 
opinion would seem to be correct.”90  
The commentator, however, ignored the Brooke Court’s caveat: the Court added that “the 
question of the power of Congress, broadly considered, to discriminate in its legislation, is not 
necessary to decide.”91 Even if “such power is expressly or impliedly prohibited,” the Court 
stated, the “prohibition cannot be stricter or more extensive” than the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause upon the states, and this law would be valid if enacted by 
a state.92
Indeed, plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of federal legislation often argued that the 
Due Process Clause placed similar or equivalent restrictions on the federal government as the 
Equal Protection Clause put on the states.  The Court, while sometimes entertaining such claims, 
was careful not to endorse this position.93  In McCray v. United States,94 for example, the Court 
stated,   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
87 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (suggesting that freedom of speech is a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
88 214 U.S. 138, 142 (1909). 
89 Id. at 149. 
90 E. Connor Hall, Due Process of Law and Class Legislation, 43 AM. L. REV. 926, 927 (1909). 
91 Brooke, 214 U.S. at 150. 
92 Id. 
93 The Court’s hesitation in acknowledging an equal protection component to due process seems to call into question 
the views of those, such as Howard Gillman, who argue that Lochner-era liberty of contract due process 
jurisprudence was primarily about opposition to unequal “class legislation.”  See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 73.  For 
a provocative and stimulating attempt to reconcile various understandings of Lochner-era due process jurisprudence, 
see Barry Cashman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, ___ B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).  
94 195 U.S. 27, 61-62 (1904). 
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Conceding, merely for  the sake of argument, that the due process clause of the 5th 
Amendment would avoid an exertion of the taxing power which, without any basis for 
classification, arbitrarily taxed one article and excluded an article of the same class, 
such concession would be wholly inapposite to the case in hand. 
 
In United States v. Heinze,95 the Court assumed without deciding “that Congress may not 
discriminate in its legislation,” but noted that even with that assumption, Congress still has the 
general power to make reasonable classifications in legislation.96  In the Second Employers’ 
Liability Cases,97 the Court concluded that a law that imposed liability only on interstate carriers 
by railroad was constitutional “[e]ven if it be assumed that that clause is equivalent to the ‘equal 
protection of the laws’ clause of the 14th Amendment, which is the most that can be claimed for 
it here.”98
Lower federal courts were similarly circumspect.  One court stated that the only possible 
prohibition on federal discriminatory legislation was the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment:  
The limitation in the former is ‘without due process of law.’ In the fourteenth 
amendment this limitation is accompanied with a prohibition of the denial of the ‘equal 
protection of the laws.’ Of course, the latter expression is broader than the former, 
although it must be conceded that the mere denial of the ‘equal protection of the laws’ 
might run into the other limitation.99
Another court held that even if the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is broad enough 
to guarantee “equal protection of the laws” against Congressional action to the same extent the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals vis-a-vis the states, it would still deny the 
defendant’s claim.100 Similarly, a federal district court concluded that even if the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting discriminatory legislation, the law at issue was 
not discriminatory, nor did it create an arbitrary classification.101   
                                                          
95 218 U.S. 532, 546 (1910). 
96 Id. 
97 223 U.S. 1(1912). 
98 Id. at 52–53. 
99 United States v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 165 F. 742, 745–746 (C.C.Mass. 1908). 
100 Watson v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 169 F. 942, 947 (D. Ark. 1909). 
101 Coca-Cola Co. v. Nashville Syrup Co., 200 F. 153, 155 (D. Tenn. 1912). In yet another case, a plaintiff argued 
that a District of Columbia law was unconstitutional class legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The court 
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At least one federal court, however, explicitly found an equality guarantee in the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.  A 1911 circuit court opinion stated that the “due process of 
law” guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment “implies the administration of equal laws according to 
established rules by competent tribunals.”102  
Meanwhile, with the exception of cases involving what we today would call “regulatory 
takings” and decided as property rather than liberty cases,103 there were no United States 
Supreme Court cases decided just before or during the Lochner era clearly invalidating 
legislation as “class,” “unequal,” “special,” “partial,” or “discriminatory” legislation by relying 
on the Due Process Clause alone.104 Most Supreme Court discussions of class legislation 
involved only the Equal Protection Clause, even in cases in which due process claims were 
raised.105  For example, the Court held that a law creating special, more lenient rules for torts 
committed by striking workers violated the fundamental rights of employers under the Due 
Process Clause. The Court then held that the rules in question also constituted illicit class 
legislation under the Equal Protection Clause.106
Nevertheless, treatise writers insisted that due process contained an equal protection 
component.  Hannis Taylor, author of 1917’s Due Process of Law and The Equal Protection of 
the Laws, wrote that the idea that “the generality and equality of laws, as a necessary part of due 
process, is purely an American creation.”107  He added that these were, in fact, elements inherent 
in due process in its American form; they existed long before the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and were therefore something independent of the guarantee that no state shall 
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”108
                                                                                                                                                                                           
noted that the Fourteenth Amendment only applied to state legislation and not to D.C., but assumed arguendo that a 
prohibition on class legislation by Congress in the District of Colunbia may be implied “from our form of 
government.” Siddons v. Edmonston, 42 App. D.C. 459, 466 (1914). 
102 United States v. Billings  190 F. 359, 363 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (emphasis added). 
103 See generally Cashman, supra note 93 (noting that rate regulation cases comprised a large percentage of 
Lochner-era Fourteenth Amendment cases, and that these cases “would eventually find a settled home in the Due 
Process rather than Equal Protection Clause”). 
104 Some early cases relied on both an equal protection and due process analysis to invalidate laws that unjustly 
discriminated, including what one author claims was the first case in which the Court declared that a state police 
regulation was unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with due process “as a substantive requirement.” See 
Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894); MOTT, supra note 58, at 341. 
105 See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 333-34 (1921).  
106 Id. 
107 Hannis Taylor, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 297 (1917).  
108 Id. at 307. 
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Five years later, Charles K. Burdick wrote that the Due Process Clause established “as a 
standard those principles of liberty and justice which lie at the foundation of our Anglo-Saxon 
institutions.”109  He added:  
 
No federal legislation has as yet been declared lacking in due process because it denied 
the equal protection of the laws. On the other hand the Supreme Court has entertained 
and given serious consideration to attacks upon federal legislation based upon the 
ground that, because of unreasonable classification, it denied the protection of 
reasonably equal laws . . . . It seems, therefore, that the conception of due process does 
exclude legislation which inflicts inequality of burden, which is clearly arbitrary, and 
without any basis in reason.110
 
Indeed, the Court ultimately did not completely abandon the equality component of due 
process.  Rather, the Court limited due process’s potency and scope, so that the Equal Protection 
Clause remained the primary barrier to class legislation, with due process playing only a 
subsidiary role, providing only a “required minimum” of protection against unequal laws.  Chief 
Justice Taft explained in Truax v. Raich in 1921: 
 
The [equal protection] clause is associated in the amendment with the due process 
clause and it is customary to consider them together.  It may be that they overlap, that a 
violation of one may involve at times the violation of the other, but the spheres of the 
protection they offer are not coterminous.  The due process clause brought down from 
Magna Charta was found in the early state constitutions and later in the Fifth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution as a limitation upon the executive, legislative 
and judicial powers of the federal government, while the equality clause does not appear 
in the Fifth Amendment and so does not apply to congressional legislation.  The due 
process clause requires that every man shall have the protection of his day in court, and 
the benefit of the general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds 
not arbitrarily or capriciously, but upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial, 
                                                          
109 CHARLES K. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 408 (1922); 
see also Oliver H. Dean, The Law of the Land, 48 AM. L. REV 641, 668 (1914). 
110 Id. at 418–419. 
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so that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and immunities under the 
protection of the general rules which govern society.  It, of course, tends to secure 
equality of law in the sense that it makes a required minimum of protection for every 
one’s right of life, liberty, and property, which the Congress or the Legislature may not 
withhold.  Our whole system of law is predicated on the general fundamental principle 
of equality of application of the law.  ‘All men are equal before the law,’ ‘This is a 
government of laws and not of men,’ ‘No man is above the law,’ are all maxims 
showing the spirit in which Legislatures, executives and courts are expected to make, 
execute and apply laws.  But the framers and adopters of this amendment were not 
content to depend on a mere minimum secured by the due process clause, or upon the 
spirit of equality which might not be insisted on by local public opinion.  They therefore 
embodied that spirit in a specific guaranty.111
 
That same year, in La Belle Iron Works v. United States,112 the Court, while noting that the Fifth 
Amendment has no equal protection clause, suggested that some more flexible limits are placed 
on unequal [federal] taxation by the “more general requirement of due process of law in 
taxation.”113
The equal protection component of due process also played a significant role in one of the 
most controversial cases of the Lochner era, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.114  In Adkins, the 
Court held that a federally-mandated minimum wage for women in the District of Columbia 
violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Writing for the Court, Justice Sutherland 
argued that, in regulating wages, the law violated liberty of contract without a proper police 
power rationale,115 a traditional due process concern.  Other rationales provided by Sutherland, 
however, seem closer to traditional equal protection analysis, though Sutherland couched these 
                                                          
111 Truax, 257 U.S. at 331-32 (citation omitted). 
112 256 U.S. 377 (1921). 
113 Id. at 393. This language seemed to implicitly overrule language in Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co. 240 U.S. 1, 
24 (1916), suggesting that the Fifth Amendment placed no limits on Congress’s taxing power:  
So far as the due process clause of the 5th Amendment is relied upon, it suffices to say that there is 
no basis for such reliance, since it is equally well settled that such clause is not a limitation upon 
the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution; in other words, that the 
Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring, upon the one hand, a taxing power, and 
taking the same power away, on the other, by the limitations of the due process clause. 
114261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
115 Id. at 554-555. 
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concerns in terms of the statute’s arbitrariness, as opposed to discrimination per se.  First, 
Sutherland suggested that the most constitutionally suspect aspect of the minimum wage law in 
question was that it placed an arbitrary, unfair burden on a particular class, employers, who 
should not be expected to bear the costs of supporting employees who lacked the skills to earn a 
better wage.  The Court also suggested that the law contained arbitrary classifications because it 
purported to provide a minimum living wage for women, yet assigned different wages to women 
in different occupations, and did not take into account the disparate needs of different women.116  
 
C. THE EQUALITY COMPONENT OF DUE PROCESS AS A LIMIT ON POLICE POWER RATIONALES FOR 
VIOLATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
 
With the exception of the rate regulation cases and the odd ambiguous case arising under 
federal law such as Adkins, while the Equal Protection Clause prohibited all discriminatory 
legislation that did not have a valid police power justification, due process only entered the 
equality picture when a legal classification infringed on a liberty or property right recognized by 
the Court.  Once the Court found such an infringement, mere hostility against the group 
negatively affected by the classification could not justify the infringement.  Moreover, even 
government ends considered legitimate could not justify the infringement if the means chosen 
created too great a burden on liberty or property rights, if there was not a tight means-ends fit. 
 This line of reasoning seems to have originated in Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in 
Plessy v. Ferguson,117 though Harlan did not explicitly rely on the Due Process Clause.  Harlan’s 
opinion is often interpreted to mean that racial classifications are always invalid under the Equal 
Protection Clause, but it says no such thing.  Rather, Harlan argued that the railroad segregation 
law in question violated the “personal liberty” of black and white citizens to share a railroad car 
if they so choose: 
 
It was said in argument that the statute of Louisiana does not discriminate 
against either race, but prescribes a rule applicable alike to white and 
colored citizens.  But this argument does not meet the difficulty.  Every 
                                                          
116 Id. at 556-57. 
117 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Bernstein (93.4)  20 
one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so 
much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as 
to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white 
persons.  Railroad corporations of Louisiana did not make discrimination 
among whites in the matter of commodation for travelers.  The thing to 
accomplish was, under the guise of giving equal accommodation for 
whites and blacks, to compel the latter to keep to themselves while 
traveling in railroad passenger coaches.  No one would be so wanting in 
candor as to assert the contrary.  The fundamental objection, therefore, to 
the statute, is that it interferes with the personal freedom of citizens.  
“Personal liberty,” it has been well said, “consists in the power of 
locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to 
whatsoever places one’s own inclination may direct, without 
imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.”  If a white man 
and a black man choose to occupy the same public conveyance on a public 
highway, it is their right to do so; and no government, proceeding alone on 
grounds of race, can prevent it without infringing the personal liberty of 
each.118
 
Harlan then argued that infringement on this liberty cannot be justified by a desire to maintain 
white supremacy.119
 Twelve years later, Harlan authored a similar dissent in Berea College v. Kentucky,120 
arguing that mandatory segregation in private schools violated liberty rights without a valid 
police power purpose: 
 
The capacity to impart instruction to others is given by the 
Almighty for beneficent purposes; and its use may not be 
forbidden or interfered with by government—certainly not, unless 
                                                          
118 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
119 For an excellent discussion of the Plessy dissent, see Alexander T. Aleinikoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan’s 
Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 961. 
120 211 U.S. 45 (1908). 
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such instruction is, in its nature, harmful to the public morals or 
imperils the public safety.  The right to impart instruction, 
harmless in itself or beneficial to those who receive it, is a 
substantial right of property—especially, where the services are 
rendered for compensation. But even if such right be not strictly a 
property right, it is, beyond question, part of one’s liberty as 
guaranteed against hostile state action by the Constitution of the 
United States. . . . Have we become so inoculated with prejudice of 
race that an American government, professedly based on the 
principles of freedom, and charged with the protection of all 
citizens alike, can make distinctions between such citizens in the 
matter of their voluntary meeting for innocent purposes, simply 
because of their respective races?121
 
The majority evaded Harlan’s argument by holding that the law was justified not as a police 
power measure, but as a modification of Berea College’s state corporate charter.122
Harlan’s line of reasoning, however, was implicitly adopted in the 1917 case of Buchanan 
v. Warley.123  Some scholars have portrayed Buchanan as an Equal Protection Clause case, but 
the Equal Protection Clause never appears in the opinion, even though it was explicitly relied 
upon in the plaintiff’s briefs.124  The Court instead relied on the plaintiff’s alternative argument, 
that the statute infringed on the Due Process Clause’s protection of property.  Noting this 
reliance, some scholars have portrayed Buchanan as a pure property rights case, divorced from 
any concerns for equality.125  A close reading of the case belies this interpretation as well.126
                                                          
121 Id. at 67–69 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
122 For a discussion, see David E. Bernstein, Plessy versus Lochner: The Berea College Case, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 93 
(2000).  
123 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
124Brief for Plaintiff in Error on Rehearing at 27–36, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Brief for Plaintiff in 
Error at 26, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
125 See ALEXANDER BICKEL & BENNO SCHMIDT, THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 811-12 (1986) 
(recounting the views of those who think that Buchanan was purely a property rights decision); ANDREW KULL, THE 
COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 139 (1988); (“The usual explanation for how it came about that the Supreme Court 
should vote unanimously to strike down a segregation ordinance in 1917—is that Buchanan is essentially a decision 
defense of property rights.”).  A more nuanced view is taken by Michael Klarman, who concludes that “Buchanan 
probably had more to do property rights than with civil rights.” MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS 82 (2004). 
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The Court did indeed rely on the right to alienate property as the basis of its holding in 
Buchanan, but equality concerns came into play as well.  The question before the Court was 
whether the law infringed on property rights for a valid police power purpose.127  After 
recounting the post-Civil War statutory and constitutional attempts to protect the rights of 
African Americans, the Court concluded that “[c]olored persons are citizens of the United States 
and have the right to purchase property and enjoy and use the same without laws discriminating 
against them solely on account of color.”128  The state’s “attempt to prevent the alienation of the 
property in question to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the 
State, and is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Constitution preventing state interference with property rights except by due process of 
law.”129
The Court specifically rejected each of Kentucky’s asserted police power rationales for 
upholding the law. First, the Court dismissed the argument that existing “race hostility” was an 
appropriate rationale for narrowing the scope of citizens’ constitutional rights.  The Court also 
rejected the argument that the segregation law came within the police power because it would 
promote the public peace by preventing race conflict.  While the Court acknowledged that this 
was a desirable goal, it could not be accomplished “by laws or ordinances which deny rights 
created or protected by the Federal Constitution.”130
The Court added that a segregation law could not be justified as promoting the 
“maintenance of the purity of the races.”131  The Court noted that the law did not directly 
prohibit the “amalgamation of the races.”132  The law did not even prohibit African Americans 
from working in white households.133  Rather, the right at issue, according to the Court, was “the 
civil right of a white man to dispose of his property if he saw fit to do so to a person of color and 
of a colored person to make such disposition to a white person.”134  Finally, the Court spurned 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
126 For additional discussion, see David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, Judicial Power and Civil Rights Reconsidered, 
114 YALE L.J. 591 (2004); David E. Bernstein, Philip Sober Restraining Philip Drunk: Buchanan v. Warley in 
Historical Perspective, 51 VAND. L. REV. 799 (1998)  
127 The Court acknowledged that “property may be controlled in the exercise of the police power in the interest of 
the public health, convenience, or welfare.” Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 74. 
128 Id. at 78–79. 
129 Id. at 82. 
130 Id. at 81. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 See id. 
134 Id. 
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the claim that the law was necessary to prevent the depreciation in the value of property owned 
by white people when African Americans became their neighbors.135  The Court noted that 
property owned by “undesirable white neighbors” or “put to disagreeable though lawful uses” 
could similarly depreciate property.136  The Court implied that African Americans had to be 
treated as rights-bearing individuals and not as members of a subordinate class.  The Court 
reaffirmed Buchanan’s holding in 1927137 and 1930.138  
 Six years after Buchanan, in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of Columbia,139 
the Court invalidated a minimum wage law for women using an analogous line of reasoning.  In 
Buchanan, the Court had identified the right to acquire and alienate property as an interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause.  In Adkins, the Court identified liberty of contract as a 
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.  In Buchanan, the Court held that denial of 
property rights for African Americans could not be based on weak race-related police power 
rationales.  In Adkins, the Court held that women could not be denied liberty of contract based 
solely on weak gender-related police power rationales. 
The government in Adkins asserted that the minimum wage law was necessary to preserve 
women workers’ “good health” and “morals.”140  Sutherland wrote that women were, after 
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, fully equal citizens, which in turn created a presumption 
that laws subjecting women to special disabilities or privileges are unconstitutional.141  He wrote,  
                                                          
135 Id. at 82. 
136 Id. 
137 Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927). 
138 City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930). 
139 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
140 Id. at 540. 
141Sutherland was undoubtedly sincere in his advocacy of women’s rights, having been an advocate of women’s 
suffrage and the Equal Rights Amendment in his earlier political career.  See Speech of Sen. George Sutherland of 
Utah, at the Woman Suffrage Meeting, Belasco Theater 3–4 (Dec. 13, 1915) (“To my own mind the right of women 
to vote is as obvious as my own. . . . [W]omen on the average are as intelligent as men, as patriotic as men, as 
anxious for good government as men. . . . [T]o deprive them of the right to participate in the government is to make 
an arbitrary division of the citizenship of the country upon the sole ground that one class is made up of men, and 
should therefore rule, and the other class is made of women, who should, therefore, be ruled.”).  Sutherland was an 
adviser to Alice Paul, leader of the National Woman’s Party, which advocated an Equal Rights Amendment that, 
among other things, would have banned special protective legislation for women.  See Reva B. Siegel, She the 
People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 97, 1013 (2002).  
Felix Frankfurter attacked Sutherland’s opinion in Adkins as a “triumph for the Alice Paul theory of constitutional 
law, which is to no little extent a reflex of the thoughtless, unconsidered assumption that in industry it makes no 
difference whether you are a man or woman,” quoted in ELIZABETH FAULKNER BAKER, PROTECTIVE LABOR 
LEGISLATION 98 (1925). 
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 while the physical differences must be recognized in appropriate cases, and legislation 
fixing hours or conditions of work may properly take them into account, we cannot 
accept the doctrine that women of mature age, sui juris, require or may be subjected to 
restrictions upon their liberty of contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case 
of men under similar circumstances.142  
 
Also in 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court invalidated as a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause a Nebraska law banning the teaching of foreign 
languages to schoolchildren.  The Court recognized a liberty interest in parents providing an 
education for their children, and found that the law infringed on that interest without a proper 
police power rationale.  Meyer was a “Lochnerian” decision.  As Robert Post notes, Meyer built 
on the Lochner line of economic liberty cases but “resolutely refuses to confine that realm [of 
liberty] to mere matters of economic exchange.  This refusal is particularly striking because the 
[opinion’s] assertions [of broad liberty rights] are supported only by the citation of a long string 
of substantive due process decisions dealing with specifically economic regulation, ranging from 
Lochner itself to Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.”143
The Meyer law had been motivated by nativist hysteria attendant to World War I, and the 
state claimed the following police power justifications for the law:  
 
[T]he purpose of the legislation was to promote civic development by 
inhibiting training and education of the immature in foreign tongues and 
ideals before they could learn English and acquire American ideals; and 
“that the English language should be and become the mother tongue of all 
children reared in this State.” It is also affirmed that the foreign born 
population is very large, that certain communities commonly use foreign 
words, follow foreign leaders, move in a foreign atmosphere, and that the 
                                                          
142 261 U.S. at 540. Thus, if one considers the actions of the D.C. government in the 1920s to be “federal action,” 
Matthew Perry is incorrect when he argues that Justice Frank Murphy’s opinions in a series of cases in the mid-
1940s “represent the first time a Supreme Court Justice not only suggested, but recognized and then applied an equal 
protection guarantee, through use of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, to federal governmental 
action which affected civil rights and liberties.”  Matthew J. Perry, Justice Murphy And The Fifth Amendment Equal 
Protection Doctrine: A Contribution Unrecognized,  27 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 243, 247 (2000).  
143 Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 
1532–33 (1998). 
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children are thereby hindered from becoming citizens of the most useful 
type and the public safety is imperiled.144
 
The Court, while acknowledging the importance of ensuring that children attain proficiency in 
English, rejected the none-too-subtle discriminatory impetus behind the law, concluding that “the 
statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency 
of the state.”145
 Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court invalidated an Oregon law inspired 
by anti-Catholic sentiment that prohibited private school education.146  The Court reasserted the 
right of parents to direct their children’s education, and completely ignored the state’s asserted 
police power interest in mandating that all children attend the public school “melting pot” that 
would create a homogenous citizenry.147
 The Court faced a similar issue in 1927 in Farrington v. Tokushige, which involved a 
challenge to a law designed to shut down Japanese-language schools in Hawaii, then a federal 
territory.148  The Ninth Circuit noted that the government’s justification for the law was based on 
the fact that Hawaii had “a large Japanese population,” and that “the Japanese do not readily 
assimilate with other races; that they still adhere to their own ideals and customs, and are still 
loyal to their emperor.”149  The Supreme Court opaquely stated that it “appreciated the grave 
problems incident to the large alien population of the Hawaiian Islands.”150  However, the Court 
concluded that “[t]he Japanese parent has the right to direct the education of his own child 
without unreasonable restrictions; the Constitution protects him as well as those who speak 
another tongue.”151
 Thus, by the late 1920s, several precedents held that once the Court identified a liberty 
interest protected against government interference by the requirement of due process of law, the 
government could not justify legislative interference with that interest by appealing to prejudice 
                                                          
144 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. 
145 Id. at 403. 
146 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
147 See Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary v. Pierce, 296 F. 928, 938 (D. Ore. 1924), aff’d 
sub. nom. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
148 273 U.S. 284 (1927). 
149 Farrington v. Tokushige, 11 F.2d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 1926), aff’d, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). 
150 273 U.S. at 299. 
151 Id. at 298. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Bernstein (93.4)  26 
against, or stereotypes about, the group the legislation targeted. And like Bolling, two of these 
precedents, Adkins and Tokushige, arose under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
By the time Bolling v. Sharpe was decided in 1954, most of these precedents were moribund 
because of the Court’s rejection of Lochnerian jurisprudence in the late 1930s.  The Court 
explicitly overruled Adkins in 1937.152  The following year, it reinterpreted Meyer, Pierce, and 
Tokushige as opinions protecting minority nationalities and religions from discriminatory 
legislation,153 rather than as substantive due process liberty opinions holding that discriminatory 
impulses are not valid police power interests justifying infringement on liberty.  Similarly, the 
Court in Shelley v. Kraemer154 favorably cited Buchanan v. Warley, but obscured the fact that 
Buchanan was a due process and not an equal protection case.  
 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Bolling Court, faced two obvious choices in justifying 
its Fifth Amendment holding.  First, the Court could have issued an opinion expressly relying on 
an equal protection component of due process.155  Instead, Warren asserted that the protections 
                                                          
152 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
153 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, 
Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1366–67 (2004) (noting that this interpretation of 
these opinions had no reasonable basis). 
154 See 334 U.S. 1, 12 (1948). 
155 In 1943, in Hirabayashi, the Court stated that “the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause and it 
restrains only such discriminatory legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due process.”  Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).  However, the Court added that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely 
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the 
doctrine of equality.  For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been 
held to be a denial of equal protection.”  Id.  Moreover, the Court stated that it “may assume that these 
considerations would be controlling here were it not for the fact [of] the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time 
of war and of threatened invasion.”  Id.  In Korematsu, the Court reiterated that “all legal restrictions which curtail 
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.”  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 
(1944).  While the Court did not identify the source of this dictum, given that the case involved the internment of 
Japanese Americans by the federal government, the logical source would be the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause. 
Justice Murphy, who dissented, relied explicitly on the Due Process Clause, but only as to the deprivation of 
procedural due process, not substantive liberty.  Id. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting).  Thus, it would be logical to 
interpret the majority’s reference to “civil rights” as the denial of procedural, not substantive rights, and thus an 
inapt precedent for Bolling’s substantive due process holding.  In any event, the Japanese plaintiffs were clearly 
deprived of their liberty in the internment cases.  It is therefore not at all clear that any opinion in these cases 
invoking equal protection principles relied purely on discovering an equal protection component of due process, as 
opposed to invoking a principle that deprivations of liberty that involve racial classifications will require a stronger 
police power (or in these cases, national security) justification than would be required to justify a typical deprivation 
of liberty by the Federal Government. 
 As for the three opinions cited by Warren for the general proposition that discrimination can be so egregious as 
to violate due process, a review of the briefs filed in Bolling reveals that, ironically, these three cases were cited by 
the defendants in Bolling for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection Clause.  
Brief for Respondents, Bolling v. Sharpe, 1952 WL 47280. In fact, these cases were brought to Warren’s attention 
by his clerk, Earl Pollock, who cited them in pointing out to him that Bolling required a separate opinion from the 
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provided by the Due Process Clause overlap with those provided by the Equal Protection Clause, 
but failed to rely on this rationale.156  Warren also cited the Japanese internment cases for the 
proposition that racial classifications must be subjected to heightened scrutiny.157  However, the 
point of this citation appears to be that those cases raised the bar for the Federal Government to 
prove that its violation of Blacks’ substantive due process liberty rights was not arbitrary. 
Second, the Court could have relied explicitly on the substantive due process jurisprudence 
of the 1910s and 1920s, adding the right to attend (or send one’s child to) a non-segregated 
public school to the educational liberty rights identified in Meyer, Pierce, and Tokushige.  
Instead, Warren ignored all of the relevant substantive due process precedents except for 
Buchanan v. Warley.  As a result, the Bolling opinion seems incoherent, a cross between a half-
hearted equal protection opinion and an inscrutable due process opinion.   
As we shall in Part III, Warren originally drafted a far more coherent substantive due 
process opinion, citing Meyer, Pierce, and Tokushige.  He modified the opinion, however, to 
avoid antagonizing his colleagues, especially Justice Black, by rescusitating the Lochnerian civil 
liberties opinions of the 1920s. 
III. BOLLING AND LOCHNERPHOBIA 
 The original draft of Warren’s opinion tracks the final opinion until the section following the 
citation of Buchanan v. Warley.  The relevant section of the draft opinion is reprinted below.  
Text common to the draft and final opinion is in italics, text that only appears in the draft opinion 
is in plain text, and text that only appears in the final opinion is in strikeout: 
 
We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining 
racially segregated public schools. The legal problem in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
other segregation cases, because “the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment has no direct relevance,” and 
“the Fifth Amendment has repeatedly been construed by this Court not to impose the same limits on federal 
discrimination as the 14th  Amendment imposes on states discrimination.” Memorandum from Earl Pollock to Chief 
Justice Earl Warren, May 3, 1954, Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Box 397. 
 Justice Murphy also argued in a concurring opinion in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. that a 
federal law that authorized mandatory collective bargaining, but allowed workers’ representatives to engage in racial 
discrimination “would bear the stigma of unconstitutionality under the Fifth Amendment in this respect.” 323 U.S. 
192, 208 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring).  Murphy did not clearly explain why he believed such a law would violate 
the Fifth Amendment, beyond to state that the “Constitution voices its disapproval whenever economic 
discrimination is applied under authority of law against any race, creed or color.”  Id. at 209. 
156 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954). 
157 See id. at 499 & n.3. 
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District of Columbia is somewhat different, however. The Fifth 
Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does 
not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth 
Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of 
equal protection and due process, both stemming from our 
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. Although 
equal protection has been the basis of most decisions involving 
racial discrimination, we have previously recognized that 
discrimination may also constitute a denial of due proces of law. 
The “equal protection of the laws” is a more explicit safeguard of 
prohibited unfairness than “due process of law,” and, therefore, we 
do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, 
as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so 
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.  
Unreasonable and arbitrary classifications may be a denial of 
due process of law.  Classifications based solely upon race must be 
scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our 
traditions and hence constitutionally suspect. As long ago as 1896, 
this Court declared the principle “that the Constitution of the 
United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and 
political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General 
Government, or by the States, against any citizen because of his 
race.”158 Thus, And in Buchanan v. Warley, this Court held that a 
statute which limited the right of a property owner to convey his 
property to a person of another race was, as an unreasonable 
discrimination, a denial of due process of law.  
The Court has applied similar reasoning to analogous situations 
in the field of education, the very subject now before us [citing 
Meyer and its companion case, Bartels v. Iowa; Pierce; and 
Tokushige]. Thus children and parents are deprived of the liberty 
                                                          
158 This sentence appeared two sentences earlier in the original draft opinion. 
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protected by the Due Process Clause when the children are 
prohibited from pursuing certain courses, or from attending private 
schools or foreign-language schools.  Such prohibitions were 
found to be unreasonable, and unrelated to any legitimate 
governmental objective.  Just as a government may not impose 
arbitrary restrictions on the parent’s right to educate his child, the 
government must not impose arbitrary restrints on access to the 
education which the government itself provides. 
Although the Court has not assumed to define “liberty” with 
any great precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from 
bodily restraint.  The essence of liberty is the Liberty under law 
extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to 
pursue., and it cannot be restricted except for a proper 
governmental objective. We have no hesitation in concluding that 
segregation of children in the public schools is a far greater 
restriction on their liberty than were the restrictions in the school 
casees discussed above.  Segregation in the public schools places 
the brand of inferiority on the minority group, saps them of their 
motivation to obtain an education, and thus hampers them 
throughout life [Citing Brown]. Segregation in public education is 
not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and 
thus it imposes on these children Negro children of the District of 
Columbia a burden that which constitutes an arbitrary deprivation 
of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.  
Due process is not a static concept: “It is of the very nature of a 
free society to advance in its standards of what is deemed 
resonable and right. Representing as it does a living principle, due 
process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may 
at a given time be deemed the limits or the essentials of 
fundamental rights.” [quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 
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(1949)].159 We have declared that the Constitution prohibits the 
states from maintaining racially segregated public schools.  It 
would be unthinkable that that the same Constitution would 
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government should have a 
lesser duty to protect what, in our present circumstances, is a 
fundamental liberty.160
Thus, the draft Bolling opinion relied on the idea that the right to pursue an education (or to 
educate one’s children) was a fundamental liberty, a sconclusion amply supported not only by 
the holdings of Meyer, Pierce, and Tokushige, but also by dictum in Meyer and Pierce stating 
that liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause include the “right to acquire useful 
knowledge.”161  While Meyer and Pierce were Fourteenth Amendment due process cases, 
Tokushige relied on those cases in interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.162
Once the right to educational liberty was recognized, it was a short leap to Warren’s 
conclusion that just “as a government may not impose arbitrary restrictions on the parent’s right 
to educate his child, the government must not impose arbitrary restraints on access to the 
education which the government itself provides.”163 And Brown clearly signified that the Court 
believed that segregation based on notions of white supremacy was an arbitrary restraint on 
public school education.  Note that Warren did not contend that states are obligated to provide 
public education.  Rather, his argument was that once they undertake to do so, they cannot 
restrict the rights of their citizens to participate in that system except in pursuit of a proper 
governmental objective. 
 As a hand-edited draft of Bolling found in Warren’s papers reveals, Warren dropped the 
initial opinion’s reliance on the 1920s precedents and its reliance on an explicit liberty interest in 
educational freedom because of objections from Justice Hugo Black.164 Black’s objection was 
                                                          
159 An earlier, undated draft of the opinion found in Warren’s papers contains an additional line here, struck out by 
Warren: “Our ideal of due process is an exapanding concept.” 
160 Undated draft, Bolling v. Sharpe, Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Box 571. 
161 Indeed, the plaintiffs quoted this language from Meyer in their brief.  Brief for Petitioners at 13, Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (No. 4). 
162 Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927). 
163 This was, in fact, precisely the argument made in the plaintiffs’ briefs and during oral argument.  Brief for 
Petitioners at 13, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (No. 4). Text of the oral argument can be found at 
http://www.lib.umich.edu/exhibits/brownarchive/oral/Hayes&Nabrit.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005). 
164 The draft shows that Warren wrote next to the citations to Meyer, Pierce, Bartels, and Farrington, and the 
accompanying text, “strikeout Black”, “Black strikeout,” and “Out”; next to a citation to Meyer “Black strike out 
citation”, and “Black out,” and next to expansive due process language and an accompnaying footnote to Wolf v. 
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consistent with his general attitude toward “substantive due process.”  In his dissent in Griswold 
v. Connecticut, for example, Black criticized the Court’s reliance on Meyer and Pierce.165  In the 
course of excoriating the Court for relying on those opinions’ “natural law due process 
philosophy,” Black claimed that Bolling “merely recognized what had been the understanding 
from the beginning of the country . . . that the whole Bill of Rights, including the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, was a guarantee that all persons would receive equal treatment 
under the law.”166  
While Black and perhaps others167 dissuaded Warren from relying on Lochner era due 
process opinions, the Bolling opinion still concluded that segregation violated liberty interests 
protected by the Due Process Clause.  Recall that the actual holding of Bolling is that 
“[s]egregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental 
objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that 
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.”168 
The Bolling Court, then, relied on a due process argument, but failed to identify precisely what 
liberty interest was involved, and also failed to cite relevant Lochner era opinions.  The due 
process argument therefore lacks coherence, and seems poorly reasoned.169   
Indeed, the Court’s substantive due process ruling was so watered-down and cryptic that, as 
we have seen,170 Black later claimed, contrary to the evidence,171 that Bolling was actually (and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Colorado “Black says strike” and Black-out.”  Warren also eliminated the line, “Segregation in the public schools 
places the brand of inferiority on the minority group, saps them of their motivation to obtain an education, and thus 
hampers them throughout life [Citing Brown]” at the suggestion of Stanley Reed, with agreement from Black.  
Undated draft of Bolling v. Sharpe, Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Box 571. 
165 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 516 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
166 Id. at 517 n.10.  
167 Though there is no record that he objected to the draft Bolling opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter could not have 
been pleased with the favorable citation to Meyer and Pierce. In 1944, Frankfurter refused to join the Court’s 
opinion in Prince v. Massachusetts because it favorably cited Meyer and Pierce.  He argued that Justice Holmes’ 
dissent in Meyer was correct, and that “I shall turn out to be a bad prophet indeed if this Court will not come to rue 
the implications of Pierce v. Society of Sisters.” Letter from Justice Frankfurter to Justice Rutledge, Jan. 22, 1944, 
quoted in Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking and the Supreme Court, 1948-
1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 48 (1979). 
168 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
169 “Although the ‘fundamental liberty’ analysis stood on shaky, even discredited, ground, it was at least 
precedented.”  Hutchinson, supra note 166, at 50.  Part of the problem, no doubt, was the extraordinary haste in 
which Bolling was drafted.  The initial drafting was assigned to Warren clerks on May 4, 1954, the draft was 
distributed to the other Justices on May 8, their comments were received the following week, and the opinion was 
released on May 17.   
170 See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
171 As shown in the annotated Bolling opinion produced above, the basis for the draft opinion was clearly a 
substantive due process rationale with equal protection dicta, and the final opinion only subtracts from the 
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solely) an equal protection case.  The Court itself, perhaps unable to decipher Warren’s cryptic 
final opinion, later adopted that interpretation of Bolling.  But for Warren’s catering to Black’s  
Lochnerphobia, it would have been clear that the Bolling holding was not based on equal 
protection.  Rather, like Buchanan v. Warley, it was a due process case holding that a violation of 
due process rights via racial classification will require a solid, nondiscriminatory police power 
justification.   
Indeed, Warren’s draft due process opinion arguably made a stronger case for the 
unconstitutionality of racial segregation under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause than 
the Court’s opinion in Brown made for the unconstitutionality of racial segregation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  If nothing else, the draft Bolling opinion 
logically follows from precedents like Buchanan, Meyer, and Tokushige, while Brown required 
the Court to reverse Plessy. 
 The Court’s Lochnerphobia weakened Bolling in other ways as well.  Even Warren’s draft 
opinion remains vulnerable to the charge that it’s absurd to think that the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause, enacted at a time when the Federal Government enforced the fugitive slave 
clause,172 and held, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, to protect slaveowners’ property rights in their 
slaves, could be interpreted to ban segregated schools.173  Here Warren could have sought help 
from Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, and authored a paragraph along the following lines: 
 
In Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, we considered the issue of 
whether women could still be presumptively be considered to have 
lesser rights under the Fourteenth Amendment than have men, a 
position that would have been consistent with the views of the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Speaking through Justice 
Sutherland, we noted that the Nineteenth Amendment, and the 
social and political changes that led to its passage, had changed the 
status of women such that they were now full citizens in American 
society entitled to equal rights under the Constitution. While 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
discussion justifying the substantive due process holding, without adding anything about equal protection. 
172 U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 2 (“No person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping 
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, 
but shall be delivered up on Claim of Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”).  
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Adkins has been overruled on its precise holding that the special 
needs of women cannot be taken into account in the process of 
regulating industrial employment, the broader legal principle 
invoked, that subsequent amendments can change our intepretation 
of the meaning of due process, remains valid.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment granted Negroes full rights of national citizenship, 
and the Federal Government may therefore no longer arbitrarily 
deprive them of liberty rights encompassed by the Due Process 
Clause. 
 
If Warren succumbed to Lochnerphobia in failing to cite Meyer and Pierce, it’s not surprising 
that he was unwilling to cite Adkins v. Childrens Hospital, among the most reviled cases of the 
Lochner era. 
The Court’s Lochnerphobia caused another problem.  To the extent that Bolling has come to 
stand for the proposition that the concept of due process contains a guarantee of equal protection 
of the laws, critics can aptly note that the post-Lochner era precedents Warren relied on were 
weak at best.  However, ample precedent from the Lochner era supported the notion that due 
process overlaps with equal protection, and some cases and commentators from that era (and also 
from the Gilded Age) argued that, at least as far as the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
was concerned, due process provided the same equality guarantees as the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 
 As noted above, an Adkins-style argument in Bolling could satisfy the “originalist”174 
objection that the Fifth Amendment was not intended to protect the rights of African Americans.  
An originalist might still object that even if the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
included a notion of equality, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause did not; that 
opposition to “class legislation” was not part of American constitutional discourse during the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
173 See Graglia, supra note 35, at 771. 
174 While one originalist methodology would be to argue that the Fifth Amendment was not intended to apply to 
African Americans, other originalists would note that the Fifth Amendment speaks only of “persons,” not “whites.”  
Given that the meaning of the word “person” is not race-exclusive, and given the natural rights background of the 
Constitution, which provides a rule of construction to interpret ambiguous provisions, these originalists could argue 
that the Fifth Amendment did indeed include African Americans within its purview, even if the Framers did not 
intend it to do so. For a good discussion of originalism, natural rights, and rules of construction, see RANDY E. 
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 125–30 (2004). 
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Founding era, and was not written into American constitutional law until the Reconstruction era.  
A full examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this Essay, but suffice for now to say that 
the idea that due process includes a guarantee that all laws be “equal and general” goes back to 
the founding era and beyond.175
The question also arises as to whether an explicit recognition in Bolling of a liberty right to 
pursue an education would have mandated a different result in San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, which held that in the absence of racially discriminatory intent, unequal 
funding of public schools does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.176  Under a Lochnerian 
analysis, the question would be whether a state was exceeding its police powers in allowing local 
jurisdictions to be the primary funders of public schools, given the funding disparities that would 
inevitably arise.  States would likely argue that Bolling should be distinguished: no Texas law 
prevented an individual who wanted her son to attend a particular public school from moving to 
that district, so the right to pursue an education was not infringed.  Moreover, given the 
advantages of local funding (and thus control) of public schools, local school funding not an 
arbitrary policy, and a lack of arbitrariness is all that’s needed to satisfy a Lochnerian test. 
 However, Warren’s draft Bolling opinion, though Lochnerian in its underlying origins, had 
declared that the right to pursue an education was a fundamental right.177  Under modern due 
process law, a right’s status as fundamental means that any infringement of the right is subject to 
strict scrutiny—the government’s actions must not be simply reasonable and non-arbitrary, but 
also must further compelling interests and be narrowly tailored to serve those interests. 
Assuming interdistrict disparities in funding were found to infringe on the right to pursue an 
education, it would have been difficult to justify these disparities under a compelling interest test.  
Even without that assumption, the effect on desegregation lawsuits, in particular, would have 
been dramatic: plaintiffs would not have had to show that the inequality of resources in black and 
white schools was traceable to the maintenance of a dual system (discriminatory intent), but 
rather simply that the inequality infringed on black students’ right to pursue their education 
without compelling justification. 
                                                          
175 See GILLMAN, supra note 73; Taylor, supra note 107, at 303–04. 
176 See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
177 See supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
 A careful analysis of Bolling v. Sharpe reveals some surprises.  First, the almost universal 
portrayal of Bolling as an opinion relying on an “equal protection component” of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause is incorrect.  The opinion is vague and opaque, but a 
comparison of Chief Justice Warren’s original draft opinion with the final opinion makes it clear 
that the Court’s precise holding was that school segregation in the District of Columbia 
arbitrarily violated black students’ right to educational liberty.  Bolling, then, was a substantive 
due process opinion with roots in Lochner era cases such as Buchanan v. Warley, Meyer v. 
Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Farrington v. Tokushige, even though the Court 
ultimately chose to cite only Buchanan. 
Among other things, Bolling’s roots in Lochnerian cases belies the oft-heard notion that the 
Lochner line of cases was somehow directly at odds with racial equality, and that the overruling 
of those cases in the 1930s was a necessary prelude to Brown.178  Indeed, not only did the 
Lochner line of cases not stand in the way of a broad interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause, Bolling shows that de jure segregation was actually highly vulnerable to Lochnerian 
argument.  The Court simply had to recognize that exclusion of Blacks from government 
services provided to whites was properly understood as a denial of Blacks’ liberty.179
Arguably, Bolling also shows the potential for a racially egalitarian jurisprudence to have 
emerged in a political environment far closer to America’s libertarian tradition than what had 
emerged by the 1950s.  As the author of this Essay wrote over a decade ago,  
 
It is possible to imagine that but for the interruption of the Great 
Depression and the New Deal, entirely different forms of civil 
rights protections would have arisen—a laissez-faire combination 
                                                          
178 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 147 (1991) (making this argument).  For an 
argument that Lochnerian cases actually shielded Blacks from protectionist labor laws promoted by white interest 
groups, see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS AND 
THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL (2001). 
179 This shift certainly required an abandonment of the Court’s previous position that the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not address issues of “social equality.”  However, as the first Justice Harlan’s career shows, there is no inherent 
contradiction between sympathy with Lochnerian reasoning and support for a broad understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  See, e.g., Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that prohibiting colleges from having integrated student bodies violated the right of teachers to 
pursue their occupations free from unreasonable government interference); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 
(1908) (Harlan, J.) (concluding that a law banning employers from firing union members was an arbitrary violation 
of liberty of contract). 
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of equal protection of the law, liberty of contract, and freedom of 
association, instead of the more statist combination of interest 
group liberalism, the welfare state, and government enforcement of 
nondiscrimination norms against private parties.180
 
 Some would argue, however, that once a Lochnerian Court acknowledged that access to a 
government-provided service could be construed as a liberty right, the entire classical 
liberal/libertarian edifice of Lochner would be lost.  After all, libertarianism is premised on the 
notion that all rights against the government are negative rights.  On the other hand, a libertarian 
might argue that to subsidize one group is the economic equivalent of taxing its competitors.  To 
subsidize whites’ education more than Blacks’ education—whether through extra monetary aid 
to white schools or merely by requiring Blacks to go to separate schools and thus, in the context 
of a racist society, inherently relegating them to second-class education—is, by economists’ 
lights, the equivalent of taxing Blacks more than whites. The right to be free from discriminatory 
taxation on an arbitrary basis such as race is certainly within the scope of the classical 
liberal/libertarian paradigm. 
Another surprise is that the proposition that Bolling has come to stand for, that the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits discrimination by the Federal Government, was not simply “made up” by 
the Supreme Court, but has a basis in longstanding precedent.  The idea that the protection from 
discrimination provided by the Fifth Amendment is precisely the same as that provided by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as the Court held subsequent to Bolling, is 
more of a stretch, but even that view has precedent in cases and commentary from the Gilded 
Age and the Lochner era.181
 Finally, Bolling is an important example of the distorting effect of Lochnerphobia on 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.  As discussed above, Bolling would have been a much stronger 
opinion had it been willing to explicitly rely on Lochner era precedents such as Meyer and 
Tokushige, and to employ a more explicitly Lochnerian view of the Due Process Clause.  
Moreover, the Justices’ Lochnerphobia eventually led the Court to abandon the liberty-to-pursue-
an-education basis of Bolling entirely, in favor of an equal protection interpretation of the case.   
                                                          
180  David E. Bernstein, Roots of the “Underclass”: The Decline of Laissez-Faire Jurisprudence and the Rise of 
Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 135 (1994). 
181 See supra Part II. 
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Because the cursory equal protection analysis in Bolling was not supported by citations to 
relevant pre-New Deal precedents, the Court subsequently instead took to heart Bolling’s 
admonition that it would be “unthinkable” to permit the Federal Government to discriminate 
when the states were banned from doing so.  The result has been the curious doctrine of “reverse 
incorporation” under which the Court has held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
somehow incorporates against the Federal Government the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause. 
 Bolling is hardly the only Supreme Court opinion that was been distorted by the Justices’ 
Lochnerphobia.  Justice William O. Douglas’s opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut infamously 
relied on the (to put it charitably) novel argument that the “penumbras and emanations” of 
various parts of the Bill of Rights created a fundamental right to privacy protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.182  Douglas explicitly disclaimed any intention of 
reviving Lochner, and,while he favorably cited Meyer and Pierce, he baselessly reinterpreted 
them as First Amendment cases.183  Justice John Marshall Harlan’s lone concurrence, by 
contrast, relied on on traditional Lochnerian substantive due process reasoning.  He argued that 
the Due Process Clause protects “basic values implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” with 
regulations that infringed on liberty permitted only if they were reasonably related to legitimate 
police power concerns.184
 Of late, the Court’s Lochnerphobia seems to waning.  The Court still rejects the economic 
substantive due process cases of the Lochner era, such as Lochner itself and Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital.185  But in a string of recent opinions, a majority of the Court has otherwise embraced a 
Lochnerian interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause consistent with 
                                                          
182 See Lund & McGinnis, supra note 153, at 1570 (calling this “plain sophistry”). 
183 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 471, 482 (1965) 
184 Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
185 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the plurality opinion explained that the reason the Court overruled Adkins was 
because “[i]n the meantime, the Depression had come and, with it, the lesson that seemed unmistakable to most 
people by 1937, that the interpretation of contractual freedom protected in Adkins rested on fundamentally false 
factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human 
welfare.” Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992) (plurality opinion).  Justice Souter 
later explained that the principle espoused in Lochner-era cases that arbitrary deprivations of liberty violated due 
process is “unobjectionable,” but “while the cases in the Lochner line routinely invoked a correct standard of 
constitutional arbitrariness review, they harbored the spirit of Dred Scott in their absolutist implementation of the 
standard they espoused.”  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 760–61 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). 
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Meyer, Pierce, and Justice Harlan’s opinion in Griswold.186  The penumbral right to privacy has 
given way to a broader protection of liberty interests against arbitrary governmental interference, 
and the sharp, post-Lochner era distinction between fundamental liberty rights protected by strict 
scrutiny and other liberty interests protected only by very limited scrutiny has eroded.187  In the 
2002-03 term, the Court held that both standardless punitive damages awards188 and restrictions 
on homosexual sodomy189 constituted arbitrary violations of rights protected by due process 
considerations, even though the Court identified no relevant “fundamental rights.”  The Court 
instead implicitly concluded that animus toward big business or homosexuals, even if based in 
deeply-rooted notions of morality, were not valid police power justifications of the defendants’ 
otherwise arbitrary deprivations of the plaintiffs’ liberty interests. 
 In this climate, where Lochnerian substantive due process protection of liberty interests has 
become relatively routine, though not uncontroversial,190 perhaps the time has come for courts 
and commentators to reconsider the Bolling opinion.  Bolling was a substantive due process 
opinion, shorn of precedent and coherent reasoning by a Court afraid of its own Lochnerian 
shadow.  As a result, Bolling receives little support from legal scholars, and has been 
misintrepreted as a pure equal protection opinion.  In fact, with its roots in Buchanan v. Warley 
and the 1920s educational liberty cases, the liberty right to be free from compelled segregation in 
education is perhaps better grounded than the liberty right to terminate one’s pregnancy, to 
engage in homosexual sodomy, or to be free from arbitrary punitive damages awards.  This will 
not satisfy critics like Bork who oppose the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence across 
the board.  But for the vast majority of legal scholars who do support the Court’s current 
substantive due process jurisprudence, Bolling should be an easy case to defend. 
                                                          
186 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 
(2003); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).  As noted in the previous 
footnote, according to Casey, what was wrong with Lochner was not that the Court had protected a nontext-based 
fundamental right, but that the Court had erred in thinking that liberty of contract was a liberty interest that the Court 
should protect.  Moreover, in contrast to Roe, the Casey Court allowed states to restrict abortion as long as the 
burden placed on women was not “undue,” a compromise that harkened back to Lochner’s deference to regulations 
of liberty that could be justified under the police power. 
187 See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2002–2003 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 21, 22. 
188 See State Farm, 538 U.S. 408. 
189 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. 
190 See, e.g., Lund & McGinnis, supra note 153 (severely criticizing the Court’s substantive due process 
jurisprudence, and Lawrence in particular). 
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